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The banning of stolen handsets from networks has been around for 20 years, but remains little used internationally.
Where used, its effectiveness is hindered by implementation problems, reprogramming, easy fencing opportunities,
and international trafficking. Kill-switches where the user remotely disables a handset and deletes data have potential
but, if non-permanent, are likely to experience similar limitations. This study proposes a set of responses to be adopted
by national governments with international coordination.
Keywords: Phone theft; Phone robbery; Blacklisting; IMEI database; Kill switch; Phone theft index; Phone theft ratioBackground
“The subjects approached the victim and started
asking about his phone, which he had in his hands.
Subject 1 then attempted to snatch the phone from
the victim. After failing to obtain the phone, subject 1
slashed the victim on his neck with a black utility
knife.” (crime report from Ryerson University 2014)
“‘Robbery victim killed for iPhone’A robbery victim
died after he was stabbed in the head with a
screwdriver…” (Daily Express 2011)
“The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the
death … Kuipers was on her way home with
colleagues on Friday in the port city of Tema when
their car was surrounded by four armed men on
motorcycles. They were robbed of mobile phones,
cameras and personal effects.” (GhanaWeb 2013)
“In 2013, 3.1 million people reported their
smartphones stolen, up from 1.6 in 2012. More people
are misplacing their smartphones, too; last year, 1.4
million Americans lost their smartphones, up fromCorrespondence: graham_farrell@sfu.ca
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in any medium, provided the original work is p1.2 million in 2012.” (Lowe 2014 reporting
information from Consumer Reports 2014)
“The Crime Survey [for England and Wales] data be-
gins to give an insight into the variation in crime by
demographic factors and suggests that 14–24 year olds,
and particularly women, are most vulnerable to mobile
phone theft” (Behavioural Insights Team, 2014b; 10)
“mobile device theft costs consumers $30,000,000,000
[$30 Billion] each year according to the Federal
Communications Commission” (H.R. 4065 House of
Representatives, 13th Congress 2014).
As these quotes suggest, the impact of phone theft and
robbery upon society is widespread, and the cost is enor-
mous and ongoing. The $30 billion annual estimate for
the United States alone is readily believable when one
considers that such costs can include not just that of re-
placing handsets but also those of the loss of personal and
financial data, repairs to cars and households where
break-ins occur, medical and health services costs, the
emotional and other psychological health costs of
victimization and injury to victims and their families, and
the cost to society from lost productivity, insurance ad-n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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(Mailley et al. 2008).
While the cost of phone theft provides the backdrop,
the focus of this study is crime prevention. It is aimed at
an international audience of government policy-makers
and senior police. However, its coverage cannot aspire to
be exhaustive, due to the rapidly evolving technologies
and the dynamic market for phones plus significant vari-
ation in policy and practice across countries. If it adds
value by bringing strands of the topic together and
thereby prompts others to pursue some of the issues fur-
ther, then it will have achieved its goal. It concludes by
summarising the problems and potential solutions iden-
tified, and these might be easily adapted into a checklist
for government and police.
For brevity, the term ‘phone theft’ is used here as a
portmanteau term for crimes where a handset is taken
illegally, which can include robberies, burglaries, car
break-ins, and various types of theft. Convergence
means the overlap between many new technologies is
increasingly blurred. Roman and Chalfin (2007) offer
the term ‘iCrime’ to refer to crime relating to smart-
phones, tablets, laptops, and similar electronic goods
that are frequent targets. Hence many of the issues ad-
dressed here will likely be relevant to the prevention of
other iCrimes.
Method
This study collates and assesses previous research on
phone theft and robbery. It incorporates information
gleaned from the publications of the phone industry and
uses media sources for some more recent information
and examples. It draws disproportionately upon the UK
experience because of the relatively more extensive in-
formation available for that country.
Reliable data on phone theft is relatively scarce. The
United Kingdom is an exception, where phone theft
drew the attention of that country’s government crime
research outfit in the 1990s. Harrington and Mayhew’s
(2001) landmark study showed rapid increases in phone
theft, and a set of questions on phone theft was added
to the British Crime Survey (now the Crime Survey for
England and Wales) in 2001/2 (Hoare 2007; Hall 2009).
This work was influential in the decision to establish the
Metropolitan Police’s National Mobile Phone Crime
Unit (NMPCU) in 2003, and to introduce the Mobile
Phone Reprogramming Act of 2002 which banned hand-
set reprogramming (discussed later).
Increases in phone theft in the last two decades go
against the grain of declining crime of many types.
Thompson (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) finds that theft and
robbery rates have fallen less than many types of crime
because they are composed of two underlying trends:“one which mirrors the more general decreases in
crime, and one which reflects increased theft due to
the greater availability of new, valuable goods that are
attractive to thieves and carried on the person,
particularly mobile phones.” (Thompson, 2014a)
While phone theft has been problematic since the
1990s, it has become increasingly newsworthy with the
rise of expensive smartphones (e.g. Choules 2012; Huf-
fington Post 2013). In mid-2013, an iPhone 5 with 64GB
memory, then top of the range, retailed for over $1500
in North America at a popular online retailera. One ex-
perienced police colleague (who shall remain anonym-
ous) conjectured that stealing two handsets per day is
easier and more profitable than dealing drugs.
The principal theoretical and conceptual reference
points for this study are as follows. Phone theft is an
instance of crime caused by an increase in suitable tar-
gets offering crime opportunities that attract and pro-
voke offenders (Wortley 2001; Clarke 2012). Hence the
present study falls within the crime science tradition,
encompassing the routine activity and rational choice
theoretical perspectives. Within this, situational crime
prevention identifies the mechanisms of victim precau-
tion by which crime is made riskier, more difficult, less
rewarding, less excusable, or less provoked, such that
quasi-rational offenders decide not to commit crime
(Cornish and Clarke 2003). Each of these is critical to
the growing literature on designing-out crime and the




Some anti-phone-theft measures have been reviewed
elsewhere though they have not, to the present author’s
knowledge, been evaluated in terms of crime prevention
impact (Mailley et al. 2006a; Whitehead et al., 2008).
They include efforts to secure handsets to the person
via clips and lanyard chains, to design more secure bags,
and to secure bags in theft-prone locations such as cafes
and bars (Arts and Humanities Research Council
undated; see Johnson et al. 2010 for responses specific
to different types of theft of property from customers in
those locations). Policing tactics include raids on stores
selling stolen phones and measures to tackle relevant
organised criminal groups. The potential deterrent ef-
fects of handset iconography and semantics, biometric
safeguards (more recently introduced as fingerprint
scans on some phone models) and other design features
have received some attention (McCardle et al. 2011).
However, the principal preventive activity in recent
years has been ‘blacklisting’, and it sets the context for























































































































Figure 1 Percent of phone subscribers covered by national EIR
(Source: CWTA Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association
2012; p.7, Table three).
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In a similar way to how motor vehicles have a unique
serial number termed the VIN (Vehicle Identification
Number), every phone handset has a unique 15-digit serial
number termed the IMEI number - the International Mo-
bile Equipment Identity. When a handset is powered-up it
uses the IMEI number to login to the network, in addition
to logging in the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card.
The SIM card identification determines who receives the
bill for network charges, and is separate from the handset’s
IMEI identification – hence SIM cards can be switched
from one handset to another with both SIM and handsets
retaining their separate identities. Thus, in theory, when a
handset is reported stolen two things occur: the network
provider will block the SIM card so that the subscriber
does not receive further network charges (regardless of
which handset is used with that SIM card), and the stolen
handset’s IMEI number is added to a list of those not
allowed access to the network: the blacklist. With the
handset being the main target, blacklisting is the focus
here.
A stolen phone could, of course, be used on a different
network. Hence national and international coordination
of blacklisting is necessary. This is intended to work as
follows. Nationally for any given country, once all net-
work providers are signed-up to undertake blacklisting,
they share their blacklists each day on a national Equip-
ment Identity Register (EIR). Each national EIR is then
shared internationally via the international IMEI Data-
base. The international IMEI Databaseb and the national
EIRs merge the blacklists and return complete lists to all
individual network providers, so that everyone can
blacklist all stolen phones. Thus, in theory, this should
remove the incentive for phone theft because a stolen
phone will not work anywhere. A recent industry report
noted that
“Every day since 1996, the IMEI Database has taken
all the black lists from different operators around the
world and added them together into one global black
list. When an EIR subsequently connects to the IMEI
Database, it downloads the latest global black list (or a
national or regional subset of the global list) for its
own use. By loading the IMEI Database black list onto
the local EIR, all handsets reported as stolen on other
connected networks up to the previous day are now
also blocked on that network.” (CWTA Canadian
Wireless Telecommunications Association 2012; 4)
Thus conceived, blacklisting appears to be an elegant
means of tackling phone theft. To locate it in the frame-
work of situational crime prevention, blacklisting ‘de-
nies the benefits’ of crime. What is apparent, however,
is that there is a gap between theory and practice. Thestatement above suggests international blacklisting has
existed for two decades - yet phone theft continues
apace. Something is amiss. The next few paragraphs
outline likely explanations.
Implementation issues
Implementation is a frequent stumbling block for crime
prevention (Laycock and Tilley 1995). Most obvious in
relation to blacklisting is that although the international
IMEI database has existed for twenty years, the number
of countries using it remains small. The Canadian Tele-
communications and Wireless Association (CWTA,
2012) reports that eight countries had all network pro-
viders connected to the international IMEI database and
were sharing their blacklists on a daily basis, and that a
further 16 countries had some networks connected
(Figure 1).
Since the CWTA report, Canada and the United States
adopted blacklisting in 2013 (Duncan 2012; Hollister
2013; Canadian Broadcasting Corportation 2013). Yet
blacklisting’s international coverage remains limited, and
the countries that are identified by CWTA (2012) as the
main destination countries for trafficked handsets, have
little or no blacklisting.
Failure to report crime to the police is a perennial
problem. Burglary and car crime are reported more than
other crimes when that is a prerequisite of an insurance
claim. However there is little incentive for uninsured
phone theft victims to report the crime to the police.
Here there is what Economists term a public goods
problem: the benefit to society that potentially accrues
from reporting (due to handset blacklisting) is greater
than that to the victim. For victims with insurance, in-
surers could perhaps incentivise blacklisting along with
reporting to the police. This might have the added bene-
fit of reducing false insurance claims that occur when a
Farrell Crime Science  (2015) 4:4 Page 4 of 11handset owner wishes to avoid paying for a handset up-
grade. Perhaps insurance premiums could be lower for
phone owners who inform the insurer of their handset
IMEI, as they are for some cars locked in garages and
households with approved security.
The extent to which networks fail to blacklist phones
when their theft is reported, is currently unknown. Re-
search using a secret-shopper approach could assess its
extent, and publication of the findings would similarly
incentivise police and networks to reduce the problem.
To tackle the problem, in the UK a Crime Reduction
Charter was signed in August 2006 wherein all of that
country’s network providers agreed to two conditionsc.
Network providers agreed to blacklist at least 80 percent
of stolen handsets and to share the blacklist across net-
works within 48 hours. The phone industry conducted
its own evaluation under the auspices of the Mobile In-
dustry Crime Action Forum (MICAF) and claims suc-
cess (Cooper et al., 2007, Mobile Industry Crime Action
Forum 2007). While this appears laudable, an independ-
ent evaluation with a transparent methodology would be
preferable. In addition, if the performance (blacklisting
rates) of network providers were a matter of public rec-
ord, this might induce improved performance as they
compete for informed customers. In addition, the com-
mitment should be to blacklist 100 percent of stolen
handsets.
Reprogramming
Reprogramming trumps blacklisting. It is an adaptive
response by offenders (Ekblom 1997) to blacklisting as a
form of crime prevention. Stolen handsets, like stolen
cars, can have their identity changed in order that they
can re-enter the legal market. Typically, the handset
software is reprogrammed to change the IMEI to one
that is valid on the network. While this has been illegal
in the UK since 2002, from the evidence relating to the
scarcity of blacklisting, it is reasonable to infer that it
remains legal in most other countries. One study
estimated that at least 5 percent and perhaps 8 percent
of phones in use in the UK were reprogrammed
(Kaplankiran et al. 2008), implying millions of stolen
phones in circulation, which seems likely to be a conser-
vative estimate. Rates of stolen phones in circulation can
reasonably be expected to be higher in countries where
reprogramming is legal.
Reprogramming of some phones has become trickier
where the IMEI is stored on a non-reprogrammable
chip. Some smartphones have an internal non-
removable battery and the shell is more difficult to open.
It takes greater expertise to physically replace a chip ra-
ther than alter software. However, there are webpages
offering instructions on how to change, for example, theIMEI of some iPhone models,d and many smartphone
models are reprogrammable (Lynn and Davey 2014).
A reprogrammed phone uses an IMEI number that is
a duplicate of that of a legitimate phone in order to be
able to login to the network when its original IMEI is
blacklisted (Kaplankiran et al. 2008). This means that if
duplicate IMEIs can be identified then they can be
blacklisted. Mailley et al. (2006a) note that Vodafone
Ireland successfully identified duplicate IMEIs and black-
listed them in order to stop stolen phones from working.
Since networks can identify and blacklist duplicate
IMEIs, this offers a relatively straightforward solution to
the problem. If there are legitimate reasons why a dupli-
cate IMEI is needed, those phones should be easily iden-
tifiable. If this practice was widespread and routinized, it
could have a dramatic effect by disabling stolen phones
on any network that shares that blacklist. In addition, it
seems likely that customers who had turned a blind eye
to the fact that their bargain handset was probably
stolen would be less inclined to make the same mistake
again if it failed to make calls.
The kill-switch
Proposed ‘kill switches’ would be activated remotely by
phone owners whose handset had been stolen. This
would trigger deletion of handset data and disable all
handset operations. This appears to have the advantage
of being more comprehensive and possibly more difficult
to overcome than blacklisting. Legislative efforts to
mandate kill switches in the United States, ongoing at
the time of writing, require that phones can be reacti-
vated if recovered (Consumer Reports 2014). This sug-
gests kill-switches would temporarily disable handsets
rather than permanently ‘kill’ them, which in turn sug-
gests there may be some potential for reprogramming of
the software to circumvent the kill-switch. Similarly,
while remote data deletion ought to reduce the chances
of additional financial or personal damage to the victim,
to the author’s knowledge, the potential for hacking to
circumvent data deletion remains unknown at the time
of writing.
While this discussion of kill-switches comprises a
relatively small section of the present study, they are a po-
tentially significant intervention (Collins 2014). However,
if kill-switches experience implementation problems and
reprogramming (and other hacking) as blacklisting has
their potential may be unachieved. By introducing this
discussion of kill-switches here, it would be hoped that
some or all of the problems could be anticipated and re-
solved prior to widespread implementation. The spectre
of reprogramming suggests that government should seek
to liaise with the phone industry to anticipate and over-
come such possibilities.
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‘Recycling’ is largely synonymous with ethical practices,
but in this context it is criminogenic. For example, as of
mid-2014 one Canadian firm posted online prices for
smartphones, iPads and other tablets that it would buy
from customers who send them by mail (CellCycle.ca
2014a). It listed prices for 256 make/model combina-
tions with prices over $200 for many smartphones and
upto $400 for tablets (CellCycle.ca 2014b). Its online no-
tices state that “All Apple product MUST have iCloud
accounts removed and ‘Find My iPhone’ disabled to
qualify for payment”, which reduces the possibility of
identification of stolen items. The Terms of Purchase say
that “We do not retain [the sellers] information for any
purpose other than making payment to you.” (CellCycle.
ca 2014c), and that “You must warrant that you are: the
owner of the device(s) that you wish to sell us” and that
the phone “must not be identified on any database as
lost or stolen”, although there appears to be no means
by which these claims are verified. This appears to be an
easy way for thieves to sell stolen phones with impunity.
It seems likely to encourage theft and robbery. Yet at the
time of writing such companies have been operating in
Canada since 2007 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
2009) which, perhaps not coincidentally, is the year the
iPhone was released.
In the UK, recycling firms pay similar prices (BBC
2010a). In 2010, fifteen UK recycling firms, suggested to
represent 90 percent of the industry, signed up to a code
wherein they check the IMEIs of handsets against the
National Mobile Phone Register which is a national
database of stolen phone IMEIs (BBC 2010a). While this
would appear to be a policy worthy of replication else-
where, it would be unlikely to be effective without en-
forcement, and there do not appear to be plans to make
available information on monitoring or evaluation of ad-
herence to the code. It would be informative to know if
the code had reduced the likelihood that a recycling
company turns down a valuable new smartphone, and
naïve not to expect firms or employees to turn a blind
eye to handsets which sell for even more money abroad
than in the UK. If firms were publicly accountable, this
would increase any deterrent effect. Again, a secret-
shopper monitoring or detection and enforcement sys-
tem, offering blacklisted smartphones to recycling firms
and publicised to maximise its deterrence effect, could
promote adherence, particularly if poorly operated firms
can be closed-down (just as unhealthy restaurants are
closed). Some consideration might be given to safe-
guards to ensure that the employees of recycling firms
do not divert stolen phones to alternate fences. In
addition, recall that even the industry only claimed a 90
percent sign-up to the charter. A police investigation
that examined whether the remaining 10 percent aredisproportionately receiving stolen phones (or whether
phone theft rates are higher in neighbourhoods nearest
to unchartered recyclers) might be useful, as would re-
quiring their sign-up and adherence to the Charter.
Other aspects of the stolen goods market
When a store in Detroit bought electronic goods over
the counter, no questions asked, customers lined up
along the street. The store had no identity check re-
quirements for sellers, or checks on the provenance of
goods. It was, in effect, licensed fencing, with customers
bringing sometimes dozens of phones, laptops and tablet
computers (Smith 2013). Such practice can be expected
to facilitate, prompt and provoke theft and robbery, and
similar accusations could likely be levelled at eBay,
Craigslist and other online resellers. There is a clear
need for harmonisation of regulation relating to such
practices.
An array of measures have been proposed to tackle
stolen goods markets (Sutton 2005). In the case of
phones, measures might be tailored to particular modes
of sale and local circumstances. One design possibility is
a ‘licence plate’. Displaying a handset’s identity on its ex-
terior could nudge buyers and sellers into a greater pro-
portion of legal activity. Portable phones have long
carried an IMEI label, typically hidden under the battery
in tiny print. If IMEI numbers were routinely made vis-
ible on the exterior of handsets this would allow poten-
tial buyers to check whether it matched the IMEI in the
phone’s software. Typing *#06# onto the touchpad of
most phones reveals the 15-digit IMEI number. The
overall effect would be to raise the profile of the theft
problem and shrink the stolen handset market via at
least five mechanisms: Buyers of pre-owned handsets
could check that handset and software IMEIs match and
are not on the blacklist; Retailers could no longer claim
ignorance regarding stolen or reprogrammed phones;
Online sellers would soon be obliged to state that they
have verified a handset IMEI; Police could more easily
check whether a handset is stolen, and; The visibility of
IMEIs would promote the transfer of information for
blacklisting.
The phone licence plate is a concept that draws on ve-
hicular security. Licences facilitate identification of
otherwise identical individual units. Vehicle owners were
first required to display their name on their vehicle, then
in 1903 the state of Massachusetts introduced licence
plates (Newman, 2004). For phones, design effort would
be required to identify suitable licence plate parameters
and make them attack resistant. A system with less than
15 digits (vehicle plates typically uses seven alpha-
numeric) would make them more memorable thus also
promoting reporting and recording for blacklisting
purposes.
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Phones blacklisted in one country will still work in all
but ten others according to the above assessment of use
of the international IMEI database. The average price of
a handset may be higher in other countries than in the
‘source’ country where it is stolen, making trafficking
worthwhile: in 2013, smartphones stolen in the UK were
reported to sell for up to £1,000 in other countries
(Telegraph, The 2013).The present study has identified
only one effort to measure the extent of trafficking, de-
tailed in Mailley et al. (2006a), and suggesting that hand-
sets stolen in the UK turned up in countries around the
world. That research was conducted by the O2 network
provider and consisted of providing networks in other
countries with a copy of the UK handset blacklist and
asking them to identify any calls made on their networks
from those handsets. The same work, now rather dated,
appears to be the source of the Canadian Wireless Tele-
communications Association (CWTA Canadian Wireless
Telecommunications Association 2012; 3) report that
notes stolen handsets account for 90% of handsets
sold in Russia, 85% in the Ukraine, 66% in Central and
Eastern Europe, and 27% in Africa and the Middle East.
One presumes data on Western Europe and north
America was less readily available or unsought. Such re-
search warrants replication and extension. It could poten-
tially be used to identify key countries and trafficking
relationships and thereby used to focus prevention
activities.
A note of caution is necessary, however, due to the
paucity of information on trafficking because, with re-
gard to the international trafficking of cars from the UK,
Clarke and Brown (2003) found it was far less extensive
than many commentators had anticipated. However,
while the precise extent, nature and variation in traffick-
ing warrants further study, this should not preclude
some discussion of prevention possibilities.
The international IMEI Database is a potential key to
reducing international trafficking. It was described earl-
ier and requires the daily exchange of network blacklists
on an international basis, and its main problem for two
decades has been lack of coverage. However, it may be
possible to incentivise manufacturers and networks to
stem the sale of imported stolen phones. In particular,
manufacturers in recipient countries seem to effectively
lose market share if phones stolen elsewhere are sold in
their market: Mailley et al. (2006a; 406) report that a
survey of customers in Russia found Motorola to be the
most popular make of handset even though Motorola
did not sell handsets in that country (at a time when the
Motorola Razr not the iPhone was the iconic handset).
An estimate of their losses might encourage manufac-
turers in domestic markets to reduce the number of
imported stolen phones. The manufacturers might havethe leverage to encourage network providers to use the
international IMEI Database. The industry could perhaps
argue that the international IMEI Database is difficult to
use, which seems an untenable argument from such a
technically sophisticated industry, particularly due to its
existing use elsewhere.
Regulation and market-based incentives
It is fairly well established that industry is best placed to
develop anti-crime measures relating to its own prod-
ucts and services (Clarke and Newman 2005). This is be-
cause the relevant industry has the technical know-how
and inside knowledge. The flagship case is the car indus-
try. Car theft increased rapidly during the 1960s, 70s
and 80s but has been stemmed by vastly improved ve-
hicle security, with remote tracking technologies offering
promise of continuing declines (Brown, 2004, Flatley
et al. 2010, Fujita and Maxfield 2012, van Ours and
Vollaard 2013 Farrell et al. 2014). Yet car manufacturers
took time to introduce such measures and often had to
be pushed into it by the public shaming of a well-
publicised car theft index, or forced into it via regulation
(Laycock 2004). The differential timing of the introduc-
tion of good quality electronic immobilizers in different
countries suggests that national legislation or threat of
such tended to play a key role.
There is also evidence that when crime affects the
phone industry itself, it responds efficiently and effect-
ively. Fraudulent calls using phone ‘clones’ that cost the
industry millions were stopped in their tracks (Clarke
et al. 2001). When it comes to theft of handsets however,
there may be perverse incentives for the industry to turn
a blind eye: A stolen phone generates a new sale for
manufacturers when the handset is replaced, while net-
work providers generate call revenue from both the
stolen and the new phones. But even if this is not the
case, there seems to be little incentive for the industry to
act, as it would inevitably incur costs. It is cheaper for
the phone industry to allow victims and society to con-
tinue to pay the cost. This suggests there is an important
role for government in overcoming this failure of the
market.
Theft indices
Theft indices are a form of market-based incentive for
crime reduction. The UK government announced in
2013 that it would support the development of a phone
theft index (Beckford 2013). A risk-based phone theft
index was described by Farrell and Mailley (2007) as a
development of a simpler count-based index (Mailley
et al. 2006b, Mailley et al., 2008), wherein
“The new ranking presented in this article is based on
phones’ risk of being stolen, taking into account that
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be on the streets than others.” (Farrell and Mailley,
2007; 30)
Those authors also reported on interviews conducted
with phone thieves. Thieves noted how they make deci-
sions to steal some models rather than others based on
visual cues about the model of phone and its value:
“Offenders use visual cues to assess whether a phone
is worth the effort… for indicators of value and
whether or not it will be easy to fence. Thieves
obviously prefer the more valuable phones. Just as
prestige cars are targeted for ‘re-sale’ thefts, iconic
‘in-demand’ phones and expensive models with
sophisticated functions, are targeted.” (Farrell and
Mailley, 2007; 30)
It is well established that burglars and car thieves use
visual cues to make informed choices about targets
(Taylor and Nee 1988; Bichler-Robertson and Potchak
2002; Light et al. 1993; Cromwell and Olsen 2003; Nee
and Meenaghan 2006). Similar decision processes mean
that snatches, sneak thefts (dipping and ripping into
bags) and robberies, are more likely to be precipitated
by potentially lucrative smartphone models. In contrast,
phones stolen during burglaries and car break-ins would
not likely involve prior knowledge of the handset model.
The distinction between these two types of theft (choice
and non-choice of model type), presented as a ratio, was
the basis for identifying the riskiness of different models
in the risk-based index (Farrell and Mailley 2007,
Mailley 2011).
In the UK, data to generate a routine phone theft
index is held by the NMPCU. It is likely that an index
can be simply, cheaply and routine produced on a timely
basis. The phone handset market is faster moving than
that for cars so a quarterly rather than annual index
might be appropriate, though at minimum a well publi-
cised annual index should stimulate preventive activity
among manufacturers. It seems likely that additional
work would be needed to develop similar capacity in
other countries.
After the present study was completed and accepted
for publication, the UK’s Home Office published a risk-
based phone theft index using the methodology de-
scribed above. The report contains a useful review of
theft risks in that country and the phone theft ratio
shows Apple iPhones 4 and 5 to be riskiest. The proven-
ance of the method is acknowledged in a blog post
(Behavioural Insights Team 2014a, 2014b).
Government purchasing power (GPP) is a potentially
powerful nudge to use alongside a phone index. If govern-
ment buyers preferred phone models and networks thatperform best on crime prevention indicators such as those
discussed here (assuming similar quality of other services),
that would most likely encourage security.
Anticipating hurdles
Some commentators have raised the spectre of obstruc-
tionism. The term was coined to capture the array of
impediments that arise, often seemingly inadvertently,
when vested interests are at work. It was recently re-
ported that
“A “kill switch” which would help prevent a
smartphone being stolen has been rejected by mobile
phone carriers in the United States, with government
officials accusing companies of “shaking down”
customers for billions of dollars in insurance costs.”
(Johnson 2013).
It seems likely that the phone industry, comprising
handset manufacturers and network providers, will raise
objections to the development of implementation of
measures that incur costs, even if there is a greater net
benefit to the rest of society. Three potential areas where
this issue could arise are outlined here by means of ex-
ample: First, the prevention efforts are not technically
feasible; Second, they are too costly; Third, the crime
will only displace and so there is no point.
Objections relating to technical feasibility are probably
the trickiest to overcome because there are few people
outside of the phone industry with the same detailed
know-how of the hardware, software and systems. This
means that discussions of such technicalities could
quickly deteriorate, with the well-meaning police officer
or policy wonk quickly overwhelmed. Advanced plan-
ning would be the best means of overcoming this, as
well as using specialised knowledge where it exists. In
the UK, for example, this might be lodged at the
NMPCU, though since this national police unit has re-
ceived funding from the phone industry, there could
conceivably be competing interests.
Objections relating to cost were once the industry’s
objection to blacklisting, along the lines of ‘Thirty sec-
onds per call operator, at so-many calls per day over a
year costs us the equivalent of n millions of pounds’.
Such objections should, with some preparation, be tack-
led with evidence of how small the cost is in the relative
picture of overall industry costs as well as the far greater
cost to society of the crimes involved. Promoting corpor-
ate social responsibility offers a potential terminology
here.
Objections relating to displacement should, in theory,
be most easily overcome due to the broad range of evi-
dence and arguments against it. The comprehensive re-
view of evidence by Guerette and Bowers (2009) finds
Farrell Crime Science  (2015) 4:4 Page 8 of 11that, in short, most good crime prevention efforts pro-
duce little or no displacement and many often produce
the opposite – a ‘diffusion of benefits’ wherein crime
also falls in unanticipated ways or places as a result of
the intervention.
Anticipating future crimes
A means of side-stepping industry reluctance might be
to anticipate new criminogenic developments. White-
head and Farrell (2008), for instance, argued that forth-
coming contactless swipe-payments would produce a
crime harvest. Subsequently, the UK phone industry’s
body published a press release noting a range of prevent-
ive activities, particularly PIN-code requirements for any
non-trivial payments, and automated detection of mul-
tiple rapid payments (a signature of possible theft) and
‘encouraging’ contactless payment customers to sign-up
to ensure their IMEI numbers are registered (Mobile
Industry Crime Action Forum 2009). One additional
way of promoting industry action might be to educate
the industry’s chief executives with respect to the experi-
ence of some of the robbery victims who received
serious injuries.
Continued crime-proofing should be a part of any
crime reduction efforts. Interviews with phone thieves
suggest biometric locks and proximity alarms would
induce a deterrent effect (McCardle et al. 2011), though
the iPhone 5’s ‘Touch ID’ fingerprint scanner and similar
technologies do not seem to have been formally evalua-
tede. In addition to proposed kill-switches and remote
deletion of data, software that facilitates tracking of
handsets without requiring the cooperation of phone
networks, may increase detection possibilities, though
currently these are overcome simply by powering-off the
device. Likewise, phones can increasingly synchronise
and interact with other electronic products. One of these
allows a phone user to connect to their car, to view
inside it, lock it, start the engine, and to track and
potentially disable the vehicle if stolen (BBC 2010b).
Such measures appear laudable but should be subject to
crime proofing, that is, the system should be checked to
ensure it does not provide additional crime opportun-
ities. In this instance, if a phone is stolen, its connectivity
might increase the chance that the car to which it is
paired is also stolen. Hence, as phones become increas-
ingly integrated with household, business and other
security, there is a need for crime-proofing to ensure
such own-goals do not result.
Conclusion
The enormous success of the car industry in preventing
theft of its products is arguably the flagship for promot-
ing the involvement of industry in security and crime
prevention. Better vehicle security means car theft hasfallen, often by around three-quarters, in many advanced
countries (Farrell et al. 2011). This provides clear evi-
dence that a seemingly intractable high volume crime
can be prevented by improved design, without much if
any displacement. However, while it provides further evi-
dence that industry is best placed to develop product se-
curity, it also shows the need to overcome market failure
via a mix of regulation and incentives. There is growing
evidence that market failure is common when it comes
to crime prevention, because there is no natural incen-
tive for the relevant industry to develop the required se-
curity. If left to its own devices, no industry will pay for
security without an added incentive to do so. This ne-
cessitates government intervention, and it took many
years to incentivise car security. There is a clear case for
more immediate and more forceful action by govern-
ment to promote efforts to curtail phone theft, and for
international coordination to plug the gaping holes in
use of the international IMEI database. The alternative is
an apathy that effectively causes more crime at great
cost to victims and society.
The core activity to prevent phone theft to date has
been the blacklisting of phone handsets. An examination
of blacklisting and its sequalae was central to the present
study. A number of problems with blacklisting and other
areas were identified and these are summarised in
Table 1 along with the solutions proposed herein. In
some ways this is a shopping list of measures that could
potentially be used as a springboard for action by
governments. The available evidence suggests that
the UK has gone some way to introducing some of the
measures but that most countries remain largely in the
starting blocks.
Many of the issues detailed here in relation to black-
listing seem likely to be relevant to more recently
proposed ‘kill-switches’. While kill-switches could con-
ceivably have a higher implementation rate if they are
triggered by users, there appears to be a need for
government and industry to anticipate potential software
hacking that would circumvent the kill-switch. Key areas
identified where action by national governments is often
likely to be required are the lack of coverage and imple-
mentation of blacklisting, the possibility of reprogram-
ming, ‘recycling’ and other forms of criminogenic resale
markets, and international trafficking.
The set of measures recommended here will require
political will and for technical expertise to be developed
by police, governments, and international agencies. In
the dynamic phone market where technology and crime
opportunities evolve rapidly, promoting the responses
identified here should be viewed as a starting point.
The harmonisation of best practice, encouraged via an
international body, would seem to be one possible way
forward. An international convention or charter would
Table 1 Problems and solutions
Problem Proposed solution
A. Lack of coverage
International IMEI database unused Concept: International bodies and agencies promote national-level blacklisting
How: Governments encourage national networks. United Nations promotes
international treaty obligations. Monitoring and publicity.
National EIR unused or partially used Concept: Promote blacklisting by networks.
How: Incentives and regulation by government, monitoring and enforcement of
adherence.
B. Stolen phones remain unblacklisted
Theft unreported to network. Concept: Encourage reporting.
How: Incentivise victim reporting via insurers; Require police communication to
phone networks; Regulate networks and incentivise call takers to solicit information
from callers.
Theft reported but IMEI unknown to victim. Concept: Networks can identify IMEIs.
How: Regulate networks; Networks incentivise call takers to identify IMEIs and
blacklist them.
IMEI not blacklisted by network. Concept: Require blacklisting.
How: Regulate networks to require blacklisting; Phone theft index; Monitoring (e.g.
secret shopper surveys), publicity and fines.
C. Reprogramming
Handset reprogramming Make reprogramming illegal. Incentivise design-solutions by phone industry. Po-
licing tactics.
Duplicate IMEIs allow stolen phones to work Networks should blacklist duplicate IMEIs.
D. Kill-switches
Kill-switches potentially vulnerable to reprogramming and
other hacking
Requires government to liaise with industry to anticipate and design-out problem
E. Stolen goods markets
Recycling: Stolen handsets bought by recycling firms Regulation of recycling firms; Monitoring with publicity; Enforcement with fines.
High street and online secondhand goods markets Regulation; codes of conduct; transparency and accountability of buyers and sellers.
F. Handset trafficking
Stolen handsets shipped to markets without blacklisting International promotion of blacklisting; Monitoring and enforcement of use of
international IMEI Database. Market research to identify and target destination
markets and networks.
Manufacturers (who lose market share) should be informed of market share lost to
trafficking.
G. Future developments
New technologies, offender adaptations and other change may
produce new incentives for theft and robbery
Anticipatory crime-proofing.
Farrell Crime Science  (2015) 4:4 Page 9 of 11require buy-in from governments, and would allow
those with little knowledge of the technology to avail
themselves of the expertise of others. Best practice
guidelines for national governments in relation to each
of the areas addressed here would seem to be a minimal
requirement and could be relatively easily compiled. The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
might be an appropriate agency to encourage adoption
of the international IMEI Database. Perhaps an Inter-
national Convention on Traffic in Telecommunications
Products, or an additional protocol to the 1973 Inter-
national Telecommunication Convention, could requireIMEI database sign-up, blacklisting charters, reprogram-
ming illegality and other measures by member states.
CITES (the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species) or the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs provide potential models for frameworks
against trafficking, and the International Narcotics Con-
trol Board a possible template for a monitoring agency.
Endnotes
aTwo retailers listed the 64GB Apple iPhone 5 at this
price or over on Amazon on 26 July 2013.
Farrell Crime Science  (2015) 4:4 Page 10 of 11bGSMA IMEI database at http://www.gsma.com/technical-
projects/fraud-security/imei-database accessed 24 April 2014.
cA copy of the Mobile Phone Industry Crime Reduction
Charter is at http://www.micaf.co.uk/uploads/micaf.pdf
accessed 24 April 2014.
dFor example, see iClarified’s ‘How to change your
IPhone IMEI with ZiPhone’ at http://www.iclarified.com/
entry/comments.php?enid=657#commentsanchor
accessed 13 July 2011.
eThe Apple iPhone 5 was the latest model from that
manufacturer at the time of writing.Competing interests
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